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Background
Schistosomiasis is a parasitic infection affecting approximately 
230 million people worldwide1. Infection is caused by trema-
todes (flukes) of the genus Schistosoma. Because the infec-
tion is responsible for considerable morbidity worldwide, 
particularly in Africa, schistosomiasis was recently listed among 
the top 10 infections for which a vaccine should urgently be 
developed2.
Controlled human infection (CHI) studies are an important tool 
for vaccine development. They provide a platform to safely and 
swiftly test vaccine candidates for the pathogen in question. Fur-
thermore, they can contribute to understanding host-pathogen 
interactions and help to unravel the nature of protective immu-
nity. They have been used successfully for a substantial number 
of infectious diseases, including malaria, dengue, and influenza3. 
A CHI model has now been developed for schistosomiasis at 
Leiden University Medical Center, where Dutch volunteers 
with no previous exposure to schistosomiasis participated3. 
However, the response to schistosome infection, and to candi-
date vaccines, is likely to be different in endemic countries. In 
such settings multiple differences in environmental exposures, as 
well as prior exposure to schistosomes, drive differences in both 
the innate and adaptive immune responses which determine 
infection susceptibility and vaccine responses4,5.
We are therefore working towards the establishment of a control-
led human infection model for schistosomiasis in Uganda, where 
Schistosoma mansoni is highly endemic. Almost 30% of the 
population is estimated to be infected6, with half the population 
at risk7. As a first step we held a stakeholders’ meeting in 
Uganda in November 2017, and we published the meeting report 
and resultant road-map for the implementation process8. A key 
element of the road-map was to undertake a risk assessment. 
This document therefore aims to provide an assessment of 
risks that may arise before, during and after start of a controlled 
human infection model with Schistosoma mansoni (CHI-S) in 
Uganda.
Male and female schistosomes live in the mesenteric or perivesi-
cal veins of their human host, where they mate and produce eggs. 
These eggs are either released into the environment through fae-
ces and urine or stay within the host tissue where they induce 
inflammation. When the excreted eggs reach fresh water, they 
hatch and release miracidia that can then infect a suitable snail 
host. Infected snails are able to shed larvae, called cercariae, 
which infect humans. The Leiden University Medical Center 
(LUMC) CHI-S exposed healthy naïve volunteers to increasing 
doses of male cercariae to study the tolerability of such a con-
trolled human infection model. This male-only model avoids the 
risk of pathology caused by schistosome eggs. To generate the 
infectious cercariae for a male-only CHI-S, individual laboratory- 
reared freshwater snails are infected, each with a single mira-
cidium. Clonal replication follows, such that thousands of 
single-sex cercariae are subsequently shed by the snail. The 
sex of the cercariae can be determined by PCR, and the appro-
priate number of cercariae can be prepared for dermal infec-
tion. Because snails shed thousands of cercariae over a period of 
weeks, every time they are exposed to light, it is possible to 
first perform quality control (QC) testing on every batch (e.g. 
to assess the viability, sex and bioburden of the cercariae). Fol-
lowing principles set forward in good manufacturing practices 
(GMP) guidelines, the cercariae and their excipients are produced 
and tested for consistent quality according to predefined 
criteria. Only when compliant, is the cercariae batch released 
for clinical use. To this date, 17 people have been exposed to 
S. mansoni cercariae during CHI-S studies in Leiden.
In terms of the technical aspects of shipping infectious mate-
rial to Uganda, culturing the infectious material in Uganda and 
preparing the infectious cercariae, we have considered three 
options. 
Option 1: Shipping of parasites and snails from the Netherlands 
to Uganda. In this scenario, S. mansoni parasites and snails 
would be shipped from Leiden (The Netherlands) for preparation 
of the cercariae for human infection in Uganda. From a techni-
cal perspective, the easiest approach to rapid implementation 
of CHI-S in Uganda would be to produce and release the infec-
tious snails in Leiden and subsequently ship them to Uganda. 
In Uganda, a further snail shedding would be used to generate 
the infectious cercariae. Alternatively, S. mansoni parasites 
(for example in the form of S. mansoni eggs contained in a 
rodent liver) could be shipped separately from uninfected snails, 
which would mitigate shipment risks.
The CHI-S model in Leiden uses a schistosome strain which 
has been genotyped and has been mapped to be of Puerto Rican 
origin3. Because this strain has been laboratory adapted and 
kept in the Leiden facility since 1955, it has the advantage of its 
known virulence in animals, experience of its effects in the Dutch 
human volunteers, and its sensitivity to praziquantel. As well, 
the Leiden model uses Biomphalaria glabrata snails which are 
not indigenous to Uganda (Appendix 1 [Extended data9]). There-
fore, the ecological risks of accidental release of schistosomes 
or snails or into the environment have to be considered.
Option 2: Shipping of parasites from The Netherlands 
followed by use of local Ugandan snails. This scenario would 
involve transporting only S. mansoni parasites (Puerto-Rican 
            Amendments from Version 1
We would like to thank the reviewers for their insightful discussion 
and useful comments. In this revised version we have made the 
following changes to address the reviewer’s comments:
1. The risk score for death of snails in Table 1 was corrected
2. Information on the scoring of risks was attached to each table
3. The issue of variable Schistosoma mansoni infection susceptibility 
in Ugandan snails is mentioned in both option 2 and 3
4. Under option 3: a paragraph was added on procedures for 
cloning a Ugandan strain for CHI-S
5. Under option 3: the sentence on dose-finding was removed, 
because all three options would need dose-finding to balance 
tolerability and attack rate
6. In ‘Natural infection during trial period’ we clarified the 
sentence on female single-sex models and on the risk of 
introducing a hybridised strain into the environment
7. A paragraph was added on remuneration for participating in 
the trial and the risks associated (also added to Table 5).
See referee reports
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strain), then using local snail species such as B. choanomphala 
(from Lake Victoria) or B. stanleyi (from Lake Albert) to pro-
duce cercariae in Uganda10. Advantages, as in option 1, would 
be the fact that the parasite strain has been characterized in both 
animals and humans, which decreases its potential risk for the 
volunteers. Disadvantages would be possible technical hur-
dles to be overcome to establish a local snail colony and achieve 
successful infection with release of infectious S. mansoni 
cercariae. However, expertise in these processes already exists in 
Uganda10, subject to laboratory renovations and staff training to 
ensure compliance with GMP principles. This option would also 
be relatively simple to implement.
Option 3: Using local Ugandan parasites and local Ugandan 
snails. In this scenario the full S. mansoni laboratory life 
cycle would be established in Uganda, using a local snail species 
and starting with a new S. mansoni strain, and a rodent mamma-
lian host. Although the risk of clinically unexpected, unwanted 
side effects, or of relative resistance to praziquantel treatment, 
might be higher when using the local strain of S. mansoni, 
the ecological risk would be lowest.
All options require preparation of the cercariae for human infec-
tion under strict Quality Assurance and controlled conditions 
in Uganda with adherence to Good Manufacturing Guidelines. 
In Leiden, procedures were developed based on GMP principles 
contained in the European Commission directive 2003/94/ EC, 
with the infectious cercariae considered as an “auxiliary medici-
nal product”. Details of the procedures have been published3. 
These include production in a biosafety level 3 facility, governed 
by stringent standard operating procedures including for qual-
ity control, logging and monitoring; production and counting 
of infectious cercariae by two independent technologists; and 
antibiotic treatment and microbiological bioburden testing to 
ensure that the cercarial product is free of pathogens with poten-
tial to harm CHI volunteers. Equivalent procedures and quality 
control will be needed in Uganda in order to implement CHI-S.
In this document we address risks associated with CHI-S in 
Uganda on three different levels: i) the introduction of new 
species (the transport of snails, the snail culture facilities, the 
potential for ecological harm as a result of importing snails), 
ii) the introduction of a new schistosome strain into Uganda, and 
iii) clinical trial risks common to all options (natural infection 
during the trial period, and the risks to volunteers resulting from 
the controlled infection).
Risk assessment methods
We identified risks and potential approaches to mitigation based 
on relevant literature, experience from the Leiden CHI-S model, 
stakeholder discussions, and discussion with experts. The level 
of risk and effectiveness of proposed controls was determined 
by consensus between the authors. The inherent risk was 
defined as the risk before putting controls in place, calculated 
as the product of the likelihood and impact scores. The residual 
risk was similarly calculated, based on likelihood and impact 
scores after controls have been put in place. Mitigating 
controls could reduce the residual risk score by reducing the 
likelihood of an event occurring, or by reducing the impact if it 
should occur. Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 
5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored 
as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; insignificant 1. 
Resulting risk scores of 18–25 were considered high, and 
unacceptable. Resulting risk scores in the range of 9–17 were 
considered moderate, with further controls desirable if possible, 
and caution required if implemented at this risk level. Resulting 
scores of 0–8 were considered low, and usually acceptable.
Option 1: Shipping of parasites and snails from the 
Netherlands to Uganda
According to our first idea, infected snails would be shipped. 
The WHO report ‘Guidance on regulations for the Transport of 
Infectious Substances 2017–2018’11 provides information on 
how to adequately transport infectious substances. In accordance 
with these guidelines, shipment of S. mansoni infected snails 
falls under ‘CATEGORY B, INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCES’ 
(UN3373). Shipment of live snails is a time-sensitive undertak-
ing and therefore can only be facilitated by air shipment. Infec-
tious substances cannot be carried on as hand-luggage. Transport 
of infectious substances are subjected to International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) requirements. Packaging of 
Category B substances need to comply with rules set out in the 
P650 packaging instruction11. This involves triple packag-
ing and proper marking and documentation. Upon arrival in 
Uganda, it would be crucial for the package to clear customs 
as quickly as possible so that snails arrive in good condition. In 
order to achieve this, the customs office should be notified about 
the arrival of the shipment. In collaboration with the customs 
officer, all required documentation should be prepared in 
advance and approval for import of the products should be sought.
Alternatively, snails and Schistosoma parasites would be 
shipped separately. Uninfected snails can be shipped more easily 
because this shipment does not have to comply with the regula-
tions for the transport of infectious substances. Similar to the 
previous option, shipment should clear customs as soon as pos-
sible. These snails could be kept to reproduce in the Ugandan 
laboratory to sustain their life cycle.
A second shipment would contain Schistosoma parasites. There 
are two ways in which this material can be transported (still under 
the ‘CATEGORY B, INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCES’ (UN3373)):
1) Within a living host such as a Schistosoma-infected ham-
ster. These animals can shed Schistosoma eggs that can be used 
to infect the snails.
2) Within a preserved liver sample kept on medium from a 
Schistosoma-infected hamster. This liver sample contains 
Schistosoma eggs. Upon arrival in Uganda, further processing 
of the sample provides miracidia which can be used to infect 
the snails. Test shipments should be scheduled to determine the 
feasibility of such transports and the conditions in which the 
liver sample should be shipped. From previous experiments in 
Leiden, the preserved liver sample can be used to infect snails for 
up to one week after being harvested.
Risks associated with shipping of parasites and snails from the 
Netherlands to Uganda, and mitigating strategies, are summarized 
in Table 1.
Page 4 of 18
AAS Open Research 2019, 2:17 Last updated: 23 AUG 2019
Option 1: snail culture facilities; potential ecological 
harm
To house the Biomphalaria glabrata snails in Uganda, they 
would need to be kept in strict quarantine. B. glabrata are not 
a naturally occurring snail host in Uganda, and should there-
fore not spread to the environment. In order to house snails, an 
incubator, or room temperature, set and monitored at 28˚C is 
needed. The incubator (if used) door should be fully closed when 
the laboratory is not in use. Precautionary measures to contain 
the snails to the facility should be taken and include physical 
barriers, such as rooms with closed doors and windows. The 
snail culture basins and water drainage system should be 
covered with fine mesh to prevent escape (appendix 1 [Extended 
data9]). In addition, access to the laboratory should be controlled 
and restricted to the research team. The incubator (if used) should 
preferably be positioned away from the door. Additional security 
measures could be a double door to create a sluice. Appendix 2 
(Extended data9) lists precautionary measures that should to 
be taken when working with schistosomes. Standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) will be exchanged with LUMC and reviewed 
to fit the Ugandan facility. These SOPs deal with culture processes 
as well as the disposal of infectious material.
In case a single snail would accidentally be released into the 
environment, it is capable of reproducing in the absence of an 
opposite-sex snail using self-insemination12. This ability poses 
an ecological hazard where a single snail could develop into a 
colony. In addition, snails can be transported over large distances 
attached to birds and can survive dry conditions for up to two 
months. This snail itself is not endemic in Uganda, although 
previously this species has been held at the Vector Control 
Division of the Ministry of Health for a different project. The 
consequences of accidental introduction of this new species 
are difficult to predict, however it may result in the following 
(Appendix 1 [Extended data9]):
1)    Interspecific hybridization between B. glabrata and local 
Biomphalaria species
2)    Uncontrolled spread due to lack of natural enemies, 
competitors or pathogens
3)    Altered S. mansoni dynamics, because of potentially higher 
susceptibility of B. glabrata for S. mansoni infection
Spread to the environment of B. glabrata may go unnoticed, 
because of its similar morphology to endemic snail species.
Risks associated with culture of B. glabrata in Uganda, and 




This approach only requires transport of S. mansoni infectious 
material. This would use the second transport approach described 
in option 1, within a preserved liver sample from a schisto-
somiasis-infected hamster. The same regulatory guidelines for 
transporting infectious material apply. With regard to Ugandan 
snail species, there is variability between snail species in sus-
ceptibility to S. mansoni infection; however, there is experience 
of conducting infection of local species at the Vector Control 
Division10, so this is expected to be feasible. A major advantage 
of this approach is that the potential ecological and genetic risks 





The alternative to shipping infectious material and snails from 
The Netherlands is to re-establish the full laboratory life cycle 
of S. mansoni using Ugandan snail species and Ugandan isolates 
of S. mansoni. The life-cycle has been maintained in the past at 
the Vector Control Division of the Ministry of Health, but is not 
currently available. The advantages of using a Ugandan life 





post controlLikelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Death of snails in 
transport
Likely Critical 20 Pilot transport with low numbers 
of snails to optimize transport 
conditions
Possible Critical 15
Delays in customs 
clearance
Likely Major 16 Contacting customs 
officials to discuss required 
documentations and preparing 
documents prior to shipment
Possible Major 12
Spill of infectious 
materials and non-
indigenous snail species
Possible Major 12 Proper packaging Unlikely Moderate 6
Establishment of a  
B. glabrata colony 
outside laboratory facility
Possible Critical 15 Proper packaging Rare Critical 5
Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; 
insignificant 1.
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non-endemic snail species and schistosome strains. In addition, 
this model would be most representative of the field infec-
tions in Uganda. Similar to option 2, although susceptibility to 
S mansoni infection varies between snail species, we do not 
expect this to be an issue, because the Vector Control Division has 
experience in infecting local species. There are however several 
challenges with using Ugandan snails and isolates. With regard 
to the new schistosome laboratory strain, the characteristics of 
this would be unknown in terms of virulence and susceptibility 
to praziquantel treatment. Determining these characteristics 
would not be simple, since validated tests for schistosome 
resistance are currently not available. In addition, the new 
isolate would not be clonal and variability within the newly 
collected schistosome population might result in variable 
responses in the host, and to drug treatment. An inbred Ugan-
dan strain could be achieved by crossing clonal males and clonal 
females to produce a single F1 generation and subsequently 
cloning the offspring through snails followed by another cross-
ing. This procedure would need to be repeated several times to 
be able to generate a reasonably monomorphic strain. This proc-
ess would be laborious and time-consuming and might also 
result in quite atypical parasites, not necessarily representative 
of the Ugandan population of schistosomes in general. Ugandan 
populations have been exposed to regular praziquantel treatment 
for over a decade, so there is a risk that the initial isolates 
would include individuals with relative praziquantel resistance13 
and could not be established with certainty in the initial 
stages of the above process.  Starting with a more diverse 
selection of cercariae would generate a more representative 
laboratory population of Ugandan schistosomes, but would mean 
that the characteristics of any particular clone (notably patho-
genicity or praziquantel resistance) selected for CHI-S would 
be unpredictable.
Options 1, 2 and 3 all require the establishment of facilities in 
Uganda for production of the infectious cercariae under GMP 
principles, in order to ensure high quality, reproducible infec-
tious doses. Option 3 requires also the establishment of suitable, 
specific pathogen free animal facilities to house the rodents 
(hamsters or mice) that will provide the mammalian hosts in 
the laboratory life cycle. Risks associated with these elements 
are also considered here (Table 3).
Natural infection during trial period
The single-sex S. mansoni challenge has been designed to pre-
vent the occurrence of egg-associated morbidity. In the current 
model, volunteers participating in the trial will be infected using 
only male cercariae which penetrate the skin and result in patent 
infection. In future, a single-sex female cercariae model may also 
be used to infect volunteers. The sex of the male cercariae can 
be determined using a specifically designed multiplex real-time 
PCR which has been described elsewhere3. Once infected, indi-
viduals should avoid any exposure to contaminated water. If a 
subject were to be naturally infected over the course of the study, 
this might lead to mixed, male and female, infections, with mat-
ing of the schistosomes resulting in egg production that causes 
morbidity. If the Puerto Rican strain used in Leiden is imported 
for use in Uganda, mating and (if adequate sanitation is not used) 
excretion of eggs into the environment could alter the genetic 
make-up of Ugandan schistosome populations, with unknown 
consequences. However, given the fact that the Puerto Rican 
strain has been kept in rodents for >60 years, it seems likely 
that fitness in humans will be, if anything, lower than Ugandan 
human strains. Moreover, given that the Puerto-Rican strain is rel-
atively inbred after prolonged passage in the laboratory, and was 
shown to be praziquantel-sensitive in the CHI-S, hybridisation 
with Ugandan schistosome populations is unlikely to result in 
increased praziquantel resistance or virulence.
The chance of natural infection can be limited by choosing a 
study population which does not come into contact with fresh-
water. However, this would over-restrict recruitment from the 
true target population, which is people at risk of S. mansoni 
infection. Options to minimise this risk among volunteers from 
the preferred target population include the following:
1)    The feasibility of avoiding fresh water may be sur-





post controlLikelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Spread of Biomphalaria 
glabrata snail to environment
Possible Critical 15 1)   Precautionary measures 
for snail housing facility 
including physical barriers 
and restricted access
2)   Use of SOPs regarding 




Establishment of a B. glabrata 
colony outside laboratory 
facility
Possible Critical 15 1)   Development of 
containment strategies
Rare Critical 5
Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; 
insignificant 1.
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site and the information used to select volunteers 
least at risk of re-exposure, and to make provisions to 
support volunteers to avoid re-exposure.
2)    While selecting subjects, the investigator may ask whether 
the subject is likely to spend time in, or to travel to, 
areas where the risk of contracting a natural infection is 
high. If so, once again it should be stressed that contact 
with fresh water should be avoided; volunteers unlikely 
to achieve this would be excluded.
3)    Apart from providing information to the volunteer and 
raising awareness of this issue, frequent testing for eggs 
in stool and urine samples may be performed by micro-
scopy (and PCR). Eggs can be found 5–7 weeks after 
mixed male and female infection1. S. mansoni eggs in stool 
would indicate a concomitant natural infection, which 
would necessitate immediate treatment of the volunteer 
with praziquantel. However, stool microscopy and PCR 
is likely to be unreliable given variable egg excretion 
and the low sensitivity of stool examination for eggs14.
4)    In those trials in which natural infection may be a con-
siderable risk, testing using plasma circulating anodic 
antigen (CAA) may be conducted weekly from the 
outset of the trial. Both natural and experimental infec-
tions may then be terminated as soon as patent infection 
has been detected (e.g. at ~7 weeks post controlled 
human infection, when CAA levels > 1pg/mL). Early 
abrogation of the infection will prevent mating and egg 
laying. There would be modest drawbacks to the result-
ing data, because it would not be possible to study the 
dynamics of antigen excretion over time and quantitation 
of infection would be less accurate.
5)    Alternatively, volunteers may be displaced to a non-endemic 
region for the study duration. However, the prolonged, 
seven to 12-week “admission” required for the CHI-S 
would be a major burden and inconvenience, as opposed 
to the relatively short-duration (24 days) for malaria 
CHI studies where such approach has been employed15. 
The possibility of volunteers absconding during the study, 
given the long duration, might be significant, abrogating 
the value of such an approach. Additionally, this would 
have cost implications, in terms of providing suitable 
accommodation and compensation for loss of income.
Risks associated with natural infection during the CHI-S, and 
mitigating strategies, are summarised in Table 4.
Risks to volunteers resulting from the controlled 
human infection
Controlled infection with S. mansoni has been successfully 
performed in 17 Dutch volunteers. Although the single sex infec-
tion does not cause egg-related morbidity in volunteers, it may 
cause symptoms in response to the infection. These include der-
matitis due to the percutaneous penetration of the cercariae and 
an acute schistosomiasis as a consequence of a systemic hyper-
sensitivity response16. Severe acute schistosomiasis syndrome 
(Katayama fever) may present with symptoms such as fever, 
fatigue, myalgia, malaise, non-productive cough, eosinophilia 
and patchy infiltrates on chest radiography. In Leiden, several 
volunteers reported with systemic symptoms which seemed to be 
an acute schistosomiasis syndrome, with one volunteer present-
ing with prolonged symptoms of Katayama fever16. In addition, 
one volunteer presented with peri-orbital oedema which lasted 
one day, and may have been related to the infection16. Such 







controlLikelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
New isolates of S. mansoni 
from the Ugandan population 
might exhibit variable 
praziquantel susceptibility, or 
praziquantel resistance
Possible Critical 15 1)   Test new isolates for praziquantel 
susceptibility in vitro and in an 
animal model before use in CHI
Unlikely Critical 10
New isolates of S. mansoni 
from the Ugandan population 
might exhibit unexpected 
virulence
Possible Critical 15 1)   Test new isolates for relative 
virulence in an animal model 
before use in CHI
Unlikely Critical 10
Production processes based 
on GMP principles for single-
sex infectious cercariae not 
established in Uganda
Possible Critical 15 1)   Development of appropriate 
animal and snail facilities
2)   Training of Ugandan staff
3)   Monitoring and review by 
experienced LUMC collaborators
4)   Monitoring and review by 
Ugandan regulators
Rare Critical 5
Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; 
insignificant 1.
Page 7 of 18













Likely Moderate* 12 1)   Avoidance of fresh water bodies during trial 
period
2)   Pilot survey to establish feasibility of fresh 
water avoidance
3)   Selection of trial volunteers with low risk of 
contracting natural infection
4)   Abrogation of infection as soon as the trial 
endpoint has been reached (e.g. CAA> 1 pg/mL)
5)   Displacement of volunteers to non-endemic 












Likely Moderate 12 1)   Full clearance of infections before trial starts
2)   Continuous screening for egg production
3)   Abrogation of infection as soon as the trial 
endpoint has been reached (e.g. CAA> 1 pg/mL)
4)   Displacement of volunteers to non-endemic 
setting with excellent water and sanitation 
facilities.
Rare Moderate 3
Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; 
insignificant 1.
* The impact of natural co-infection on morbidity is classed as moderate (rather than major or critical) since volunteers who acquire such an infection would 
presumably be at risk of mixed-sex natural infections as a result of their usual behaviours and occupation. The risk of egg-related morbidity due to the 
presence of male worms from the CHI-S would therefore add little to the risk resulting from exposure to natural infection. CAA - circulating anodic antigen
Both these volunteers had received the highest dose of cercariae 
(30 cercariae) used in Leiden. The risk of severe symptoms 
can be minimised by dose escalation in modest increments. 
The impact can be reduced by careful monitoring, provision 
of symptomatic relief and abrogation of infection by treat-
ment if necessary. Frequent follow up visits need to be sched-
uled throughout the trial to discuss adverse events and conduct 
clinical assessments of the study volunteers. Safety laboratory 
tests need to be routinely performed. Volunteers can also 
experience side effects related to the praziquantel treatment. Com-
mon side effects include nausea, dizziness, and fatigue. Volunteers 
can be reassured that these symptoms are well recognised and 
transient. Their severity can be reduced by taking praziquantel 
after food. Symptomatic relief can be provided when required.
The 2017 stakeholders’ meeting identified community engage-
ment to ensure proper understanding of the CHI-S as an essen-
tial basis for ethical conduct of a CHI study. CHI is a novel 
concept in Uganda, where CHI have not been undertaken in the 
past and understanding of medical research, in general, is at a 
low level. The idea of a “medical” procedure being undertaken 
which is expected to cause symptoms, and undertaken for the 
greater, rather than an individual, good needs careful explanation. 
Rumours and misunderstandings have the potential to criti-
cally affect the work, and to have an adverse effect also on other 
institutional research activities. Engagement with national and 
community leaders, work with community advisory boards 
who can identify, and help to address, misinformation; effective 
education of volunteers to a full understanding of the expected 
effects of the CHI (and reasons for undertaking it) will all be 
essential to the smooth and safe running of these projects. 
Experiences from the first malaria CHI in Kenya give help-
ful guidance as to which issues are particularly relevant to 
participants and may require careful explanation17.
Volunteers will receive remuneration for participating in the 
trial to reimburse for expenses and compensate for time and 
burden of participation. Careful consideration will need to be 
given to determine the exact amount of the remuneration to 
avoid coercion. Recent remuneration guidelines from Malawi 
can help to calculate the amount18. In addition, formative 
research is currently being undertaken to explore within the target 
community what remuneration would be considered appropriate 
and acceptable.
Risks related to volunteers and communities during the CHI-S, 
and mitigating strategies, are summarised in Table 5.
Discussion
In this document we have reflected on the potential risks involved 
in establishing a controlled human infection model for schis-
tosomiasis in Uganda. The opinions expressed and risk scores 
allocated have been arrived at by discussion between the authors 
and are therefore subjective. In submitting this document to 
open peer review through the African Academy of Sciences 
Open Research Platform we welcome discussion of these issues.
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Based on the assessments made, our own reflections and 
proposed plans are as follows.
First, we have decided not to pursue the option of importing 
B. glabrata snails from the Netherlands to Uganda. Although 
the proposed controls were estimated to reduce the risk or 
establishing a colony outside the laboratory to low, it seems unnec-
essary to incur them. Since snail species endemic to Uganda 
are susceptible to S. mansoni infection we expect that option 
2 will work. 
Second, we propose to further pursue the option of using the 
Puerto Rican laboratory strain of S. mansoni in the CHI-S in 
Uganda. We consider that the recognised virulence and prazi-
quantel susceptibility profile of this strain makes it the safest 
option for CHI-S and have decided to have safety prevail over the 
ecological risk. The long-term in-breeding of the laboratory 
strain is an asset in this regard, making the characteristics of each 
clone of male cercariae reasonably predictable, and the strain 
possibly less fit as compared to circulating Ugandan strains. We 
also believe that the ecological risk of possible spread of the 
Puerto Rican strain of Sm will be minimized with the proposed 
measures.
To generate infectious cercariae for human infection and chal-
lenge studies following the principles of GMP it will be essen-
tial to establish a suitably controlled snail facility in Uganda. For 
sustainability (to avoid the need of repeated shipping of infec-
tious material from the Netherlands) it will also be necessary 
to establish a specific pathogen free animal facility to house the 
mammalian host and complete the laboratory life cycle.
With regard to the selection of volunteers, and avoidance of 
natural infection during the CHI-S, current activities include 
engagement with relevant Ugandan communities which are 
potential settings for recruitment of volunteers. As part of the 
engagement, options for avoidance are being explored. Our current 
view is that careful volunteer selection, close follow up and 
immediate abrogation of infection (on detection of CAA) will 
be preferable to 12-week “admissions”; but views from the 
communities will influence our future approach.
Controlled human infections with known pathogens inevitably 
involve risks and possibly the burden of symptoms. Available 
mitigations in several examples reduced our risk scores only to 
moderate, rather than low: for example, symptomatic treatment 








Likelihood Impact Likelihood Impact
Symptoms related 
to infection
Common Major 20 1)   Slow dose escalation in modest 
increments
2)   Frequent follow up visits and collection of 
adverse events.
3)   Clinical assessment and routine safety lab.
4)   Symptomatic treatment with 
corticosteroids or abrogating infection 
with praziquantel (which kills adult 
worms) if needed.




to treatment with 
praziquantel
Common Moderate 15 1)   Take praziquantel with food
2)   Clinical assessment, reassurance, 
symptomatic relief if needed
Common Minor 10
Misunderstanding 
of the nature of 
CHI-S studies
Likely Critical 20 1)   Education of community leaders, opinion 
makers and regulators
2)   Work with community advisory board
3)   Education of potential volunteers using 
tested materials





leading to coerced 
participation
Possible Moderate 9 1) Formative research to determine 
appropriate remuneration
Unlikely Moderate 6
Likelihood was scored as almost certain/common, 5; likely, 4; possible, 3; unlikely, 2; rare, 1. Impact was scored as critical, 5; major, 4; moderate, 3; minor, 2; 
insignificant 1.
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of symptoms below common, but can reduce the impact of the 
symptoms. Such areas emphasise the need for caution – for 
example, small group sizes and carefully monitored dose-escalation 
approaches.
We realize that symptoms may be different among Ugandan 
volunteers than among Dutch volunteers. Particularly, Katayama 
fever is considered less likely to occur in subjects from endemic, 
compared to subjects from non-endemic settings1. Nevertheless, 
we shall provide full information to potential volunteers about 
symptoms predicted from the literature, and those which occurred 
previously in the Dutch volunteers. We are currently piloting 
educational materials, volunteer information sheets, and tests 
of comprehension in order to ensure that Ugandan volunteers 
can be enrolled with genuine understanding and fully informed 
consent. As well, we shall work with community leaders 
and advisors to ensure optimal understanding of the work, and 
to mitigate the impact of rumours about the work which are 
likely to arise.
We conclude that, with careful risk management, CHI-S can 
be safely implemented in Uganda with a view to accelerating 




No data are associated with this article.
Extended	data
Open Science Framework: Controlled Human Infection Model 
– Schistosomiasis. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/53GT99
This project contains the following extended data:
•    Appendix 1.docx (risk assessment report addressing the 
intended transfer to and culturing of the snail Biomphalaria 
glabrata in Uganda)
•    Appendix 2.docx (Summary of safety precautions for 
working with Schistosoma)
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Zero “No rights reserved” data waiver (CC0 1.0 Public domain 
dedication).
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